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Abstract.
This work moves from a recent paper by Antoci, Dei and Galeotti [1] where a dynamic model
is proposed to describe an innovative method to improve environmental quality based on the
exchange of ￿nancial activities, promoted by a Public Administration, between ￿rms and tourists
in a given region. We extend their analysis in two directions: we ￿rst perform a global analysis
of the basins of attraction to check the stability extents of the coexisting stable attractors of the
model, and we show that some undesirable and sub-optimal stable equilibria always exist, whose
basins may be quite intermingled with those of the optimal equilibrium; then we introduce a
structural change of the model by assuming that the Public Administration, besides its action
as an intermediary between visitors and polluting ￿rms, also performs a direct action for the
pollution control. We show how the cost of this direct action of the Public Administration can be
balanced by proper taxes and we prove that undesired equilibria can be ruled out by a suitable
balance of ￿nancial instruments and direct actions of Public Administration for environmental
remediation.
Key-words: Environmental economics, evolutionary dynamics, replicator equations, multi-
stability, basins of attraction.
MSC: 34C60, 34C071 Introduction
In a recent paper, Antoci, Dei and Galeotti [1] (quoted as ADG henceforth) propose an evolu-
tionary game, to model an innovative system for environment protection based on the exchange
of ￿nancial activities, promoted by a Public Administration (PA henceforth). In a tourist region
(R) two ￿nancial options are supposed to be issued which work like contracts between the PA
and, respectively, visitors and ￿rms operating in R, and can be regarded as (cash-or-nothing)
environmental call (EC) and environmental put (EP) options. A visitor who wishes to spend
a period of time in the region R can choose between the payment of a given tax (or ticket)
or purchasing an EC sold by the PA at a given price, which will be refunded in the case of a
low environmental quality, a sort of satis￿ed-or-reimbursed contract. On the other side, the PA
o⁄ers to a potentially polluting ￿rm operating in the region R the choice between the payment
of a ￿xed tax or subscribing an EP issued by the PA. This ￿nancial activity is a contract, which
binds the ￿rm to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology, thus bearing a supplementary
cost, which can be covered with a ￿nancial aid of PA only if the environmental quality target is
reached (the same used for deciding the refunding or not of visitors subscribing EC).
In a continuous-time dynamic setting, at each time potentially polluting ￿rms have to choose
between two strategies: adopting an environmental-friendly technology and subscribing the EP,
or using cheaper but polluting technology and paying a ￿xed tax, while each visitor can choose if
purchasing reimbursable EC options or just paying a ticket. Given the observed pollution level
Q, if such level is above a threshold Q (poor environment quality) then visitors are refunded
by PA and ￿rms receive no ￿nancial aid, whereas if Q < Q, then ￿rms receive a ￿nancial
support to refund the cost they a⁄orded for adopting non-polluting technology and visitors
receive nothing (but they can enjoy the ￿ne environmental quality). Of course, the PA has only
a role of intermediator, without direct costs, as it just has the role of organizing the trade of
environmental options and check the pollution level.
In ADG the short-run time evolution of the fractions of visitors and ￿rms adopting the di⁄er-
ent strategies is modelled by using replicator dynamics, which states that the fraction of agents
(￿rms or visitors) that make a given choice increases as long as its expected payo⁄ is greater
than the one associated with the opposite choice. This short-run pro￿t-maximizing behaviour
may trigger a virtuous self-sustained long-run evolution leading to a desirable Nash equilibrium,
where all ￿rms adopt non polluting technologies and, consequently the environmental quality is
so good that no visitors are attracted by the purchasing environmental call options. However,
as often occurs in evolutionary games, this is not the only possible long-run evolution, because
other attractors may exist corresponding to "perverse" evolutions towards a "bad" equilibrium
where no ￿rms adopt environmental friendly technologies and, consequently, characterized by
permanently high levels of pollution. Sometimes other situations may be obtained as well, that
can be de￿ned as intermediate (or sub-optimal) equilibria. This coexistence of several attractors
is always associated with uncertainty, due to the fact that the ￿nal outcome is path depen-
dent, with di⁄erent outcomes obtained as the consequence of (even small) changes of the initial
conditions of the evolutionary game, according to the structure of the basins of attraction.
2We stress that some dynamic scenarios can be evidenced such that even if the basin of the
"bad" equilibrium has a small extension, it may be so intermingled with the basin of the "good"
one that the evolutionary stability of the latter is quite low, i.e. the desired equilibrium may be
very vulnerable.
The aim of this paper is to show that if in the ADG model we introduce the possibility of a
direct action of the PA for the pollution control (for example by interventions for environmental
damages remediation) then the attractivity of the desired equilibrium can be enhanced, and
some perverse and sub-optimal long-run evolutions can be eliminated by a proper combination
of the role of PA as regulator of the market of environmental options and its direct intervention.
Through a global dynamic study of attractors and their basins we show that even a moderate
direct action of the PA for environmental protection can help to induce a time evolution leading
to the desirable Nash equilibrium, by a process fuelled both by the mechanism of environmental
options regulated by the PA and its direct intervention.
Of course, the direct environmental remediation performed by the Public Administration
has a cost, but we shall prove that it can always be covered by properly tuning the ticket
paid by visitors that choose to pay the ￿xed tax, so that a "balanced budget" of the Public
Administration can always be reached.
The plan of the work is as follows. In section 2 we describe the ADG model and recall
some of their results. In section 3 we numerically explore the structures of the basins that can
be obtained with some particular constellations of parameters, and we show that the structure
of the boundaries that separate the basins of attraction of the coexisting equilibria may be
quite involved, so that in some situations it is di¢ cult to forecast the long-run outcome of the
evolutionary mechanism proposed, as already stressed in a remark given by ADG. In section 4 we
propose the modi￿ed model which includes a direct action of PA for environment remediation,
besides the role as regulator of environmental options market, and we study the e⁄ects, on the
local and global dynamic properties of the model, of this modi￿cation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model of Antoci-Dei-Galeotti
In this section we brie￿ y describe the ADG model and recall some of its properties. For more
details the reader is referred to [1] and references therein. Following [1], we consider a tourist
region R and we assume that, at each time t, each visitor has to choose (ex ante) between
strategy V 1 (buying the EC from the PA at a price e p) and V 2 (paying a ￿xed entrance ticket
at a price p), whereas a ￿rm has to choose between strategy F1 (subscribing to the EP o⁄ered
by the PA and paying a cost cNP for the adoption of an innovative non-polluting technology)
and F2 (paying to the PA a ￿xed amount q as an environmental tax associated to a lower cost
cP for using a standard polluting technology).
The number of visitors and the one of ￿rms are assumed to be constant over time, and
x(t) 2 [0;1] denotes the fraction of visitors adopting choice V 1 at time t, y(t) 2 [0;1] denotes
the fraction of ￿rms choosing F1 at time t. Of course, the complementary fractions choose the
opposite strategy, i.e. a binary game is assumed.
3Following ADG, the quality of the environment in region R at each time t is characterized
by a given measure of pollution level, denoted by Q(t), which can be compared with a threshold
level Q used to distinguish a good from bad environment at time t, according to Q(t) < Q or
Q(t) > Q respectively. Let ￿(y) be the probability that Q > Q, assumed to be a decreasing
function of the number of ￿rms that choose to adopt non-polluting technologies. ADG assume
￿(y) = 1 ￿ y (1)
i.e. a linear dependence such that ￿(1) = 0, that is the environmental quality target is surely
reached if all ￿rms choose strategy F1, i.e. all adopt non-polluting technologies, whereas if no
￿rms adopt such technologies, i.e. all choose strategy F2, then ￿(0) = 1, that is, pollution is
above the threshold level and the environmental quality target is not reached for sure.
According to ADG, the expected payo⁄s associated to the four strategies are:
EV1 (x;y) = ￿e p(x) + e r(x;y)￿(y)
EV2 (x;y) = ￿p
where p > 0 is the price of the ticket for visitors choosing option V2, e p(x) > 0 is the price of
the EC purchased by visitors choosing option V1, e rv (x;y) is the reimbursement that the PA
gives to the visitors that owe the EC when Q ￿ Q. In ADG the following linear functions are
proposed
e p(x) = p + ￿ + ￿x ; e r(x;y) = ￿ ￿ ￿x ￿ "y
where ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, " > 0 , ￿ R 0 are parameters controlled by the PA: ￿ is the
minimum di⁄erence between the price of the EC and the ￿xed ticket, obtained for x = 0; ￿
indicates the positive correlation between the price of EC and the number of visitors asking
to buy them, i.e. EC demand; the positive coe¢ cient " indicates that the amount of money
refunded to visitors in case of high pollution is negatively related to the number of non-polluting
￿rms, i.e. the same number that in￿ uences the environmental quality. The sign of the coe¢ cient
￿ is undetermined because two opposite e⁄ects coexist: from one side if the number of visitors
asking for EC increases, then the PA collects more money to be used for reimbursement, on the
other side if more visitors hold EC then more must be refunded when Q > Q.
Analogously, the expected payo⁄s for ￿rms are:
EF1 (x;y) = ￿cNP + e rF (x;y)(1 ￿ ￿(y))
EF2 (x;y) = ￿cP ￿ q
where q is the environmental tax that polluting ￿rms must pay, cP > 0 and cNP > 0 have been
de￿ned above, and
4e rF (x;y) = ￿ + ￿x + ￿y
where ￿ ￿ 0, ￿ > 0 and ￿ R 0, are coe¢ cients ￿xed by the PA; ￿ indicates a positive correlation
between the number of visitors that purchase EC and the amount of ￿nancial aids given by the
PA to ￿rms adopting non-polluting technologies whenever Q < Q, whereas the undetermined
sign of ￿ depends on contrasting e⁄ects related to the number of ￿rms to be refounded by the
PA in case of Q < Q and the fact that increasing y means more probability to reach the desired
environmental quality.
All in all, if these assumptions are inserted into the dynamic equations that express the












= y(1 ￿ y)(EF1 ￿ EF2)
where the expression of average payo⁄s EV = xEV1 + (1 ￿ x)EV2; EF = yEF1 + (1 ￿ y)EF2
has been used, one gets the dynamic equations of the ADG model:
￿
x = x(1 ￿ x)
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)x ￿ (" + ￿)y + ￿xy + "y2￿
(3)
￿
y = y(1 ￿ y)
￿
￿(cNP ￿ cP ￿ q) + ￿y + ￿xy + ￿y2￿
The following further conditions on the parameters are given in ADG to avoid trivial dynamic
behaviors of the model.
a) EV1(1;0) ￿ EV2(1;0) > 0, that is, if y = 0 then purchasing the EC must be convenient
for visitors even if x = 1; this condition becomes
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0: (4)
b) Even if ￿ < 0, a quote of the money obtained by the PA from EC, must return to
subscribers if Q > Q, i.e.
￿ + ￿ > 0: (5)
c) The non-polluting technologies (strategy F1) are more costly than ￿xed taxes and polluting
technologies (strategy F2)
cNP ￿ cP ￿ q > 0: (6)
d) If environmental quality is reached, i.e. Q < Q, then the adoption of non-polluting
technologies must be convenient, (thanks to the ￿nancial aid of PA) even if x = 0, i.e.
￿ + ￿ ￿ (cNP ￿ cP ￿ q) > 0: (7)
Under these conditions, the following result is given in ADG:
5Proposition 1. Six equilibrium points exist along the boundary of the phase space [0;1]
2,
given by the four vertices 0 = (0;0),G = (0;1);I = (1;1), B = (1;0), as well as two further
equilibria S0 = (0;y4) and S1 = (1;y3): G and B are stable nodes and the other ones are
saddle points. Moreover, an interior equilibrium may exist, P0 = (x0;y0) 2 (0;1)
2 that can be
an unstable node, a saddle, an unstable focus or a stable focus. In the latter case an unstable
close invariant curve may exist which bounds the basin of attraction of P0.
3 Multistability and basins of attraction
As shown by ADG, and recalled in the previous section, multistability, that is, the coexistence
of several attractors, is a feature of the ADG evolutionary model. In particular, the "good"
equilibrium G = (0;1), where all ￿rms adopt non-polluting technologies and consequently no
visitors are motivated to purchase the EC options, always coexists with a "bad" equilibrium
B = (1;0), where no ￿rms adopt non-polluting technologies. This can be considered as a
"poverty trap", because it can be seen as the outcome of a "perverse evolution" leading to a
situation completely di⁄erent from the desired one. In ADG a short remark is given stating
that di⁄erent structures of the boundaries of the basins of attraction can be obtained. In this
section we numerically show some typical structures of the basins of attraction, both in the case
of two coexisting stable equilibria, G and B, as well as in the case of a third one, the inner stable
equilibrium P0.
Following a suggestion given in ADG, in order to investigate some bifurcation patterns
leading to di⁄erent structures of the basins, we multiply all the coe¢ cients of the ￿rst dynamic
equation by a parameter ￿ 2 [0;1], starting from the same set of parameters proposed in ADG,
example 3, namely ￿ = 0, ￿ = 8:3, ￿ = 91, ￿ = 1:4, " = 164, ￿ = 2:5, ￿ = 1, ￿ = 2, cNP = 12,
cP = 8, q = 2.
In ￿g. 1a, obtained with ￿ = 0:4, the simplest situation is shown, where the grey region
represents the basin of attraction of the "good" equilibrium G = (0;1) and the white region is
the basin of the "bad" equilibrium B = (1;0). The boundary that separates the two basins is
determined by the union of the stable sets of the two saddle points along the vertical boundaries,
joining at the interior equilibrium P0, which is an unstable node for this set of parameters.
Fig. 1b, obtained after changing of the two parameters ￿ = 5, cNP = 13, and with ￿ = 0:7,
shows a more involved structure of the boundaries that separates the two basins. The stable
sets of the two saddle points along the vertical edges now wing around the interior equilibrium,
which is an unstable focus for this set of parameters. This gives a situation of higher uncertainty
about the long run evolution of the system.
If ￿ is further increased, the interior equilibrium undergoes a subcritical Hopf bifurcation,
at which it becomes a stable focus surrounded by an unstable closed invariant curve which
constitutes the boundary of the basin. This is the situation shown in ￿g. 2a, obtained with
the same set of parameters as ￿g. 1b and ￿ = 0:9, where the basin of P0 is represented by the




























boundaries, that still form the boundary that separates the basins of G and B, wing around the
unstable invariant curve from outside.
It is worth to notice that even if the PA can control the parameters so that the inner "sub-
optimal" equilibrium in not stable and the basin of the "bad" equilibrium B = (1;0) shrinks,
according to Proposition 1 it remains stable for each set of the parameters. Moreover, even
if the extension of its basin is reduced, such basin may be quite intermingled with the one of
the "good" equilibrium G = (0;1) and consequently its presence remains quite disturbing. An
example is shown in ￿g. 2b, obtained with the set of parameters ￿ = 160, ￿ = 8:3, ￿ = 210,
￿ = 1:4, " = 50, ￿ = 1:5, ￿ = 35, , ￿ = 5, cNP = 15, cP = 8, q = 2 and ￿ = 0:3. It is quite
evident that even if we have a smaller extension of the basin of the bad equilibrium, the good
one is still very vulnerable because points of the white basin are quite close to it.
Fig, 3 exhibits two typical trajectories that, even starting from two initial conditions which
are quite close, evolve towards the good and the bad equilibrium respectively. This kind of
dynamic evolution can be observed in all the cases shown in the previous pictures, and may
be quite misleading because the ￿rst portions of the two trajectories are almost identical, both
characterized by an increase of the fraction of visitors choosing the strategy V 1, i.e. purchasing

































84 The e⁄ects of a direct environmental protection by the Public
Administration
As argued in the previous sections, the ￿nancial market of Environmental Put and Call options
o⁄ered by the Public Administration to ￿rms an visitors respectively, as described in the ADG
model, may trigger a virtuous and self-sustained endogenous evolution leading to a ￿nal situation
where all ￿rms adopt non polluting technologies and, consequently, the environmental quality
becomes so good that no visitors are attracted by the EC options. However, this is not the
only possible evolution in the long run, because for any set of parameters there is space for
"perverse" evolutions towards a stable "bad" equilibrium, characterized by no ￿rms adopting
environmental friendly technologies and, consequently, high levels of pollutions. Moreover, other
situations may be obtained where the system evolves towards intermediate (say sub-optimal)
situations, leading to high degrees of uncertainty due to the fact that the ￿nal outcome is path
dependent, with di⁄erent outcomes obtained as the consequence of (even small) changes of the
initial conditions of the evolutionary game.
It is worth to stress that in the ADG model the Public Administration only has an indirect
role of intermediator between ￿rms and visitors, just to set up the ￿nancial market of put
and call environmental options with proper prices, as well as deciding alternative ￿xed taxes
for both. In this section we assume that the Public Administration, besides its action as an
intermediary between visitors and polluting ￿rms for trading environmental ￿nancial options,
also performs a direct action to control pollution, for example by (even moderate) interventions
for environmental damages remediation. As we shall see, such direct action, properly combined
with the regulation of ￿nancial market of environmental options described above, may enhance
the attractivity of the desired equilibrium and reduce, even eliminate, perverse and sub-optimal
long-run evolutions. Of course, the direct environmental remediation performed by the PA has
a cost, but we shall prove that it can always be covered by properly ￿xing the price p of the
ticket paid by visitors, so that a "balanced budget" for the Public Administration can always
be obtained.
In order to model the direct action of the Public administration let us modify the probability
￿(y) as follows
￿(y) = 1 ￿ a ￿ by
were a 2 [0;1] represents the e⁄ect of direct action of Public Administration on the pollution
level and b 2 [0;1] modulates the e⁄ect on the environmental quality of the fraction of ￿rms
choosing non-polluting technologies. With this modi￿cation we have ￿(0) = 1￿a, i.e. if no ￿rms
adopt environmental friendly techniques the probability that Q ￿ Q can decrease only thanks to
the direct action of Public Administration. On the other side ￿(1) = 1 ￿ a ￿ b, hence the usual
assumption ￿(1) = 0, i.e. if all ￿rms adopt non-polluting techniques then the environmental
quality goal is surely reached, implies that a + b = 1, i.e. a = 1 ￿ b. So, the probability that
Q ￿ Q becomes
￿(y) = b(1 ￿ y) (8)
9where a small value of b means a high direct intervention of Public Administration, whereas for
b = 1 the same expression of the ADG model, without any direct action of Public Administration,
is obtained. This means that (8) is a generalization of (1).
In the following we show how this change is re￿ ected on the dynamic properties of the
evolutionary model, in particular on the stability of the steady states and the structure of the
basins.
Of course, the model proposed in this section is quite similar to the one of ADG, and reported
in the previous section, so in what follows we only stress the di⁄erences between the two models
as the new parameter b varies. All the other parameters have the same meaning as in the
previous section. With (8), the expected payo⁄s become:
EF1 (x;y) = ￿cNP + (￿ + ￿x + ￿y)(1 ￿ b + by)
whereas EF2 does not change. Analogously, we get
EV1 (x;y) = ￿p ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿x + (￿ ￿ ￿x ￿ "y)(b ￿ by)
and EV2 remains the same. So, the complete dynamic model becomes:
￿
x = x(1 ￿ x)[￿￿ ￿ ￿x + (￿ ￿ ￿x ￿ "y)(b ￿ by)] := x(1 ￿ x)F(x;y) (9)
￿
y = y(1 ￿ y)[￿(cNP ￿ cP ￿ q) + (￿ + ￿x + ￿y)(1 ￿ b + by)] := y(1 ￿ y)G(x;y)
Some conditions on the parameters are modi￿ed, due to the presence of the parameter b. The
condition (4) becomes
b￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ b￿ > 0 (10)
which states that if y = 0, i.e. all ￿rms are polluting, then the visitors purchasing the EC will
be refunded even if x = 1. It should be noted that the amount of money refunded to visitors
is no longer ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, like in the ADG model, but it is smaller, because the PA uses some
money to pay its direct action to repair pollution damages, a cost for PA which is higher for





i.e. the price of the EC, given by ￿+￿, cannot be greater that its expected value, b￿by (which
becomes equal to b when y = 0) times (￿ ￿ ￿), otherwise no rational visitor will decide to by
the EC.
Conditions (5), (6) and (7) remain the same, and the following new condition is imposed
￿(1 ￿ b) ￿ (cNP ￿ cP ￿ q) < 0 (12)
which states that cost expected by a non-polluting ￿rm (given by the cost of non-polluting
technologies minus the expected ￿nancial support given by the PA if the environmental quality
10target is reached) must be greater than the cost of a polluting ￿rm when y = 0 and x = 1, i.e.
all other ￿rms are polluting and all visitors prefer to pay the ticket. This condition is imposed
in order to rule out opportunistic behaviours.
As we shall see, the (undetermined) sign of the expression
L(b) = (￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ b) ￿ (cNP ￿ cp ￿ q), (13)
will be important in the study of the stability of the "bad" equilibrium. Its meaning is the
following: If all visitors decide to purchase the EC, then the PA gets money that can be used both
for the ￿nancial support of non-polluting ￿rms and for direct intervention to repair environmental
damages. From condition (6) L(1) < 0. However, for decreasing values of b, i.e. if PA decides to
increase its direct intervention, of course taking into account (11), L(b) can change its sign and,
as we shall see, this has an important role to force the "bad" equilibrium to lose its stability, so
that "perverse" trajectories no longer occur. This is proved in the next section.
4.1 Existence and stability of equilibrium points
Besides the four equilibrium points located at the vertices of the phase space [0;1]
2, the existence
of other equilibria of the model (9) can be obtained through a study of the nullclines F (x;y) = 0
and G(x;y) = 0. Indeed, boundary equilibria are located at the intersections of F (x;y) = 0 with
the horizontal edges y = 0, y = 1 (with 0 < x < 1) or at the intersections between G(x;y) = 0
and the vertical edges x = 0, x = 1 (with 0 < y < 1). Moreover, the intersections between the
two nullclines inside (0;1)
2 de￿ne interior equilibria.
The nullcline F (x;y) = 0 is given by the following function:
x = ’(y) =
(￿ ￿ "y)(b ￿ by) ￿ ￿
￿ + ￿ (b ￿ by)
. (14)
and the nullcline G(x;y) = 0 can be de￿ned as:
x =   (y) =
cNP ￿ cP ￿ q









￿+￿b > 1 due to condition (10). Instead, along the vertical edges x = 0 and x = 1
two boundary equilibria may exist. In fact, from   (y) = 0 we get
￿by2 + [￿b + ￿(1 ￿ b)]y ￿ [A ￿ ￿(1 ￿ b)] = 0.
where A = cNP ￿ cP ￿ q, hence [A ￿ ￿(1 ￿ b)] > 0 for (12). The real and positive solution
y3 =
￿(￿b + ￿(1 ￿ b)) +
q
(￿b + ￿(1 ￿ b))
2 + 4￿b(A ￿ ￿(1 ￿ b))
2￿b
;
11gives an equilibrium S0 = (0;y3) provided that y3 ￿ 1, i.e. A ￿ ￿ + ￿, which is always true for
(7).
Analogously,   (y) = 1 gives
￿by2 + [(￿ + ￿)b + ￿(1 ￿ b)]y + L(b) = 0
where L(b) is given in (13). If L(b) < 0 then
y4 =
￿((￿ + ￿)b + ￿(1 ￿ b)) +
p
((￿ + ￿)b + ￿(1 ￿ b))2 ￿ 4￿bL(b)
2￿b
is real and positive, and y4 = 0 for L(b) = 0. Moreover, if y4 ￿ 1, i.e. ￿L(b) ￿ ￿ + (￿ + ￿)b,
then an equilibrium S1 = (1;y4) exists along the vertical edge x = 1.
The following result concerns the stability of the boundary equilibria, and should be com-
pared with Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 For the dynamical system (9) with parameters satisfying the conditions
(10), (5), (6), (7) and (12), 0 = (0;0) and I = (1;1) are saddle points, with stable set along
the vertical edge and unstable set along the horizontal edge; S0 = (0;y4) and S1 = (1;y3), when
they exist, are saddle points with unstable sets along the vertical edges.
The equilibrium point G = (0;1) is a stable node.
The equilibrium point B = (1;0) is a stable node if bT < b < 1, where
bT = 1 ￿
cNP ￿ cP ￿ q
￿ + ￿
and B is a saddle point for
b < bT
If b = bT then y3 = 0, i.e. S1 ￿ B, and the two equilibria undergo a transcritical (or stability
exchange) bifurcation.
Remark. The bifurcation condition b = bT corresponds to L(b) = 0, hence the stability loss
of the "bad" equilibrium B corresponds to a change of sign of L(b) from negative to positive.
Proof.
The Jacobian matrix of (9) computed at the equilibrium O becomes:
J(0;0)=
￿
￿b ￿ ￿ 0
0 ￿(cnp + pp ￿ cp ￿ q) + ￿(1 ￿ b)
￿
.
The ￿rst eigenvalue ￿b￿￿ > ￿+b￿ > 0 for (10). and the second eigenvalue ￿(cnp + pp ￿ cp ￿ q)+
￿(1 ￿ b) < 0 for (12). Then O is a saddle point.
At the equilibrium point I = (1;1) the Jacobian matrix is:
J (1;1) =
￿
￿ + ￿ 0
0 (cNP ￿ cP ￿ q) ￿ (￿ + ￿ + ￿)
￿
12It does not depend on b, and as in the ADG model it is a saddle point due to condition (7).




0 (cNP ￿ cP ￿ q) ￿ (￿ + ￿)
￿
.





￿ + ￿ + b(￿ ￿ ￿) 0
0 (cNP ￿ cP ￿ q) ￿ (￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ b)
￿
follows that the eigenvalue ￿ + ￿ + b(￿ ￿ ￿) < 0 because of condition (10), whereas the second
eigenvalue, associated with eigenvector along the invariant line y = 1, is negative for b > bT,
and positive for b < bT. It is easy to check that for b = bT we have   (0) = 1, i.e. S1 ￿ B. This
concludes the proof.
4.2 Global dynamic properties and "environmental policy implications"
The results of the previous section show that a suitable direct action of the PA for pollution
control, associated with its indirect action as promoter of the environmental ￿nancial assets, can
eliminate the presence of the "bad" attractor through a local bifurcation that transforms it into
an unstable equilibrium. In this section we show, by some numerical simulations, that decreasing
values of the parameter b may induce important changes in the global dynamic scenarios as well.
For example, ￿g. 4a, obtained with the set of parameters ￿ = 0:2, ￿ = 0:4, ￿ = 5:5, ￿ = 0:3,
" = 0:1, cNP = 11:3, cP = 8, q = 2, ￿ = 1, ￿ = 0:8, ￿ = 0:31 and b = 0:3, shows a situation
where the structure of the basins of attraction is such that the "good" equilibrium G = (0;1),
whose basin is represented by the grey region, is very vulnerable because some portions of the
white basin of the "bad" equilibrium B = (1;0) are very close to it. However, a computation
of the bifurcation value bT = 1 ￿
cNP￿cP￿q
￿+￿ = 1 ￿ 0:3
1:8 = 0:27 suggests that a slight decrease of
b, i.e. a slight increase of the direct action of the PA for pollution abatement, will eliminate
this problem. This can be seen by the numerical computation of the basins shown in ￿g. 4b,
obtained with b = 0:27, where the good equilibrium G = (0;1) is the unique global attractor,
i.e. its basin covers the whole region (0;1)
2.
The bene￿cial e⁄ects of decreasing values of b can also be appreciated starting from a sit-
uation with three attractors, like the one shown in ￿g. 2a. Such a situation can be seen as
a benchmark case, for the model considered in this paper, obtained with b = 1, i.e. no direct
intervention of the PA. If b is decreased, the basin of attraction of the interior sub-optimal equi-
librium, bounded by a closed invariant repelling curve, shrinks (see ￿g. 5a, obtained with the
same set of parameters as ￿g. 2b and b = 0:7) until it disappears after a subcritical Hopf bifur-




















for b = 0:65). It is quite evident that the dynamic situation is now characterized by a higher
degree of evolutionary stability of the "good" equilibrium. Moreover, if b is further decreased
until the bifurcation value bT = 1￿
cNP￿cP￿q
￿+￿ = 1￿ 3
7:5 = 0:6 is crossed, then G = (0;1) remains
the unique global attractor, and a situation similar to the one shown in ￿g. 4b is obtained.
A ￿nal remark is necessary in order to state the economic sustainability of a direct action
included in the PA environmental policy. In fact, a direct pollution abatement has a cost, so
a source of income that covers the expenses for refunding non polluting ￿rms as well as to
￿nance the direct action for pollution abatement must be found. Indeed, a balanced budget can
always be obtained by the PA by properly tuning the ticket p that visitors are asked to pay. In
fact, p does appear at all in the dynamic equations (9), hence it does not have any in￿ uence in
the dynamics of the model even if it increases the income of the PA. So, it can be used as an
exogenous parameter to control the budget balance.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a modi￿cation of the evolutionary model proposed by Antoci et al. (2009)
to describe the time evolution of a system where a Public Administration tries to reconcile the
presence of polluting ￿rms and visitors in touristic region by adopting ￿nancial instruments to
induce environmental maintenance. We have introduced in the model an additional parameter
that describes the possibility of a moderate direct intervention of the Public Administration in
the pollution control, added to its role as intermediary in the market of environmental ￿nancial
options. We have shown that by properly tuning this parameter the presence of bad asymp-


























eliminated through a transcritical bifurcation. Moreover, by a numerical analysis of the global
dynamical behaviour of the modi￿ed model, we have shown some bene￿cial e⁄ects on the struc-
ture of the basins of attraction as well. The model analyzed in this paper can also be applied to
di⁄erent situations, not only for tourists but also for citizens living in an industrial town, where
the Municipality may add to its usual direct action against pollution a role as intermediator for
some kinds of ￿nancial options in order to set up a virtuous trade o⁄ between the way citizens
pay taxes and ￿nancial supports to ￿rms that adopt less polluting technologies. As shown in our
model, a suitable trade-o⁄ between the direct action of Public Administration and the adoption
of ￿nancial instruments is necessary to help the virtuous dynamic process leading to the desired
environment quality goals.
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